Certainty as a moderator of feedback reactions? A test of the strength of the self-verification motive by ANSEEL, Frederik & LIEVENS, Filip
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business
12-2006
Certainty as a moderator of feedback reactions? A
test of the strength of the self-verification motive
Frederik ANSEEL
Ghent University
Filip LIEVENS
Singapore Management University, filiplievens@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1348/096317905X71462
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research
Part of the Human Resources Management Commons, and the Organizational Behavior and
Theory Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator
of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
ANSEEL, Frederik and LIEVENS, Filip. Certainty as a moderator of feedback reactions? A test of the strength of the self-verification
motive. (2006). Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology. 79, (4), 533-551. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School
Of Business.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5639
 1 
 
Certainty as a moderator of feedback reactions? A test of the strength of the 
self‐verification motive 
 
Frederik Anseel* and Filip Lievens 
Ghent University, Belgium 
* Correspondence should be addressed to Frederik Anseel, Department of Personnel Management and 
Work and Organizational Psychology, Ghent University, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium (e-
mail: frederik.anseel@ugent.be). 
 
Published in Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, December 2006, 79 (4), 533-551 
https://doi.org/10.1348/096317905X71462  
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. 
Submitted version 
 
 
Abstract 
The present study investigated whether employees are merely interested in hearing good news about 
themselves, as predicted by self-enhancement theory, or are more interested in feedback that confirms 
their self-concept, as predicted by self-verification theory. We examined in a field study whether self-
view certainty serves as a moderator and strengthens the effect of congruence between individuals' self-
views and the performance feedback they receive about these self-views on feedback reactions. 
Polynomial regression results revealed that people mainly reacted favourably to positive feedback. Prior 
self-views did not play a key role in explaining feedback reactions. As feedback scores were the main 
determinant of feedback reactions, it seems that feedback reactions are dominated by self-enhancement 
strivings and that self-verification strivings are less prominent. Little support was found for the 
moderating role of self-view certainty. 
 
 
The finding that performance feedback does not uniformly improve performance (Kluger & DeNisi, 
1996) has led to a renewed interest in examining feedback processes. One line of research in this area has 
paid close attention to questions such as ‘When do employees feel satisfied about the feedback they 
receive?’ and ‘When do employees intend to use the feedback obtained?’ Research examining these 
feedback reactions is important for numerous reasons, including (a) reactions represent a criterion of great 
interest to practitioners because feedback reactions are vital to the acceptance and use of any feedback 
system or appraisal system (Cawley, Keeping, & Levy, 1998) and (b) feedback reactions are included in 
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all theoretical models of the feedback process as the immediate predecessors of performance 
improvement. Providing feedback can only lead to increased levels of individual and organizational 
performance if employees are willing to accept and respond to feedback (Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 
1979; Kinicki, Prussia, Wu, & McKee‐Ryan, 2004). Given this practical and theoretical importance, 
reactions to feedback have been studied in different contexts, such as development centres (Jones & 
Whitmore, 1995), 360‐degree and upward feedback programmes (Brett & Atwater, 2001; Smither, 
Wohlers, & London, 1995), management development (Ryan, Brutus, Greguras, & Hakel, 2000), 
computer‐adaptive testing (Tonidandel, Quinones, & Adams, 2002), performance appraisal (Keeping & 
Levy, 2000) and selection decisions (Bauer, Maertz, Dolen, & Campion, 1998). 
One puzzling issue that has emerged across these different contexts is whether employees are merely 
interested in hearing good news about themselves or are more interested in feedback that confirms their 
self‐concept. Several studies could not provide an unequivocal answer to this question. Some studies 
(e.g. Brett & Atwater, 2001) found that employees reacted favourably to positive feedback, whereas other 
studies (e.g. Nease, Mudgett, & Quinones, 1999) reported that employees reacted favourably to feedback 
that was consistent with their self‐ratings. 
The current study tries to shed new light on these mixed findings by introducing a new moderator of 
feedback reactions. This moderator, self‐view certainty, is drawn from self‐evaluation theory in social 
psychology. We will examine in the present field study if people's reactions to feedback are moderated by 
the certainty of their self‐views. 
 
Theoretical background 
The determinant that has received the most attention in feedback reactions research is the feedback 
valence or feedback sign. Several studies have found that feedback recipients are more likely to accept 
and use favourable (positive) feedback than unfavourable (negative) feedback (Bannister, 1986; Brett & 
Atwater, 2001; Facteau, Facteau, Schoel, Russel, & Poteet, 1998; Halperin, Snyder, Shenkel, & Houston, 
1976; Illies, De Pater, & Judge, 2006; Stone & Stone, 1984; Tonidandel et al., 2002). This finding 
corresponds to predictions of self‐enhancement theory in social psychology. Self‐enhancement theory 
proposes that people are motivated to view themselves as favourably as possible. Hence, individuals are 
driven to elevate the positivity of their self‐concept and protect themselves from threatening information 
in order to achieve a high level of personal worth (for a review, see Sedikides & Strube [1997]). In the 
context of the feedback process, this theoretical perspective predicts that reactions are based on a one‐step 
cognitive appraisal of the feedback message: ‘If feedback is unfavourable, then dismiss it as 
inaccurate. If feedback is favourable, then accept it’. 
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In addition to the feedback sign, a second important determinant of feedback reactions is a person's 
perception of themselves before they receive feedback. These self‐views might modify the general 
tendency to accept and respond to favourable feedback. In particular, several studies reported that, in 
contrast to self‐enhancement theory, feedback reactions were not determined by the feedback sign but by 
the degree of congruence between the feedback message and the self‐views individuals had before they 
received feedback. Thus, people are more likely to accept feedback when the feedback message confirms 
their existing self‐concept (e.g. Dauenheimer, Stahlberg, & Petersen, 1999; Jussim, Yen, & Aiello, 
1995; Korsgaard, 1996; Markus, 1977; Nease et al., 1999). This finding corresponds to predictions of 
self‐verification theory. This social psychological motivation theory suggests that people go out of their 
way to maintain consistency between their self‐views and new self‐relevant information. People are 
motivated to confirm their self‐views out of a desire to maximize their perceptions of prediction, control 
and stability in an often chaotic social environment (for a review, see Swann, Rentfrow, & Guinn, 2002). 
In the context of the feedback process, this theory predicts that reactions are based on a two‐step cognitive 
appraisal, for example: ‘If the feedback is favourable and the particular self‐conception is 
unfavourable, then dismiss feedback as inaccurate. If the feedback is unfavourable and the particular self‐
conception is unfavourable, then accept the feedback message’. 
Integrating self‐verification and self‐enhancement motives 
The above indicates that it remains inconclusive as to which of the two self‐evaluation theories is 
supported when considering feedback reactions in organizations. These mixed findings echo a debate in 
social psychology between proponents of self‐enhancement theory and proponents of self‐verification 
(self‐consistency) theory during the 1960s. In origin, adherents of both perspectives questioned the 
existence of the other motive and tried to persuade the opposition (for a review, see Shrauger, 1975). As it 
could not be established which of these self‐evaluation theories was the correct one, scholars have 
recently proposed that both models might be correct. That is, people might experience a need for both 
self‐enhancement and self‐verification, but these needs vary under different conditions. Thus, the research 
question has recently shifted from ‘which motive is dominant?’ to ‘under which conditions do the motives 
operate?’, that is, research has begun to search for moderators (Sedikides & Strubbe, 1995, 1997; Swann 
& Schroeder, 1995). 
One important moderator that has been proposed is the nature of feedback reactions. On the basis of a 
review of empirical findings, Shrauger (1975) proposed that affective reactions to evaluations (e.g. 
satisfaction) might follow predictions of self‐enhancement theory and cognitive reactions (e.g. utility) 
might follow predictions of self‐verification theory. Research in the social psychological self‐evaluation 
domain has supported this hypothesis (Dauenheimer et al., 1999; Jussim et al., 1995; Moreland & 
Sweeney, 1984; Sweeney & Wells, 1990). 
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In the current study, we propose a new moderator of the self‐enhancement motive and the self‐verification 
motive in determining feedback reactions, namely, the certainty with which self‐views are held before 
feedback is received. Self‐view certainty refers to a subjective confidence of self‐beliefs and is 
conceptually related to self‐concept clarity. Self‐concept clarity differs from self‐view certainty in that the 
former refers to the global experience of the self as a clear and stable entity, whereas the latter is more 
concerned with confidence in specific self‐views (Campbell, 1990; Story, 2004). 
Swann and Schroeder (1995) identified self‐view certainty as one of the main moderators of the self‐
verification perspective. Empirical research shows that people are most inclined to seek confirmation of 
their self‐views when these self‐views are held with high certainty (Chen, Chen, & Shaw, 2004; Pelham, 
1991; Pelham & Swann, 1994; Swann & Ely, 1984; Swann, Pelham, & Chidester, 1988). Self‐views that 
are held with high certainty occupy a central position in the cognitive system of people. They are related 
to a great number of other self‐relevant cognitions and therefore possess a high resistance to change 
(Markus, 1977). When self‐concept certainty is high, the more congruent the feedback message is with 
the corresponding self‐view, the more favourably people will react. Thus, people with higher self‐view 
certainty are motivated to invest time and resources in a two‐step cognitive appraisal. 
However, when self‐view certainty is low, people are more eager to self‐enhance (Ungar, 1980). 
Uncertainty about beliefs implies a low resistance to change (Sorrentino, Bobocel, Gitta, & Olson, 1988). 
People can more easily change their low‐certainty self‐views in the direction of a more flattering self‐
image. Thus, when self‐view certainty is low, people will use a one‐step cognitive appraisal of the 
feedback. The more positive the feedback message, the more favourably people will react regardless of 
the corresponding self‐views, as predicted by self‐enhancement theory. 
In short, we expect that self‐concept certainty will moderate the effect of self‐views and feedback on 
feedback reactions. The specific theoretical predictions concerning the moderating effect of self‐view 
certainty are depicted in Figure 1. First, when self‐view certainty is low, we expect that only feedback 
scores will determine feedback reactions, regardless of the valence of the self‐concept (Figure 1a). 
Second, as self‐view certainty increases, the role of self‐views is expected to increase so that both self‐
enhancement and self‐verification strivings determine feedback reactions (Figure 1b). Third, when self‐
view certainty is high, we hypothesize that both feedback scores and self‐views will contribute equally in 
determining feedback reactions, so that feedback reactions are most favourable when feedback and self‐
views are congruent and most unfavourable when feedback and self‐views are incongruent, regardless of 
self‐view valence (Figure 1c). 
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Figure 1. Hypothesized three‐dimensional surfaces relating congruence between feedback and self‐rating 
to feedback reactions for three levels of certainty. (a) Certainty low. (b) Certainty moderate. (c) Certainty 
high. 
 
Unique contributions of current study 
There are some commonalities between the current study and previous studies in both organizational and 
social psychology that need to be addressed. Whereas our study is similar in some respects, we also 
believe that several conceptual and methodological differences make the proposed study unique and 
justify its importance. 
First, it remains unclear whether people prefer favourable or consistent feedback. Based on self‐
evaluation theory, we introduce ‘certainty’ as a new moderator variable of feedback reactions. In 
particular, we expect that self‐verifying tendencies in feedback reactions will be more pronounced as self‐
concept certainty increases. However, with decreasing levels of certainty, we expect that the self‐
enhancement motive will become more dominant in determining feedback reactions. This approach is in 
line with recent developments in self‐evaluation theory that have called for more research examining 
moderators of self‐evaluation motives (Sedikides & Strubbe, 1995, 1997). 
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Second, examining whether people prefer favourable or consistent feedback is a question of congruence 
between self‐appraisals and feedback scores. In the past, questions of feedback congruence have typically 
been answered using difference scores (e.g. Ashford & Tsui, 1990; Kernan & Lord, 1990; Vance & 
Collella, 1990). For instance, Sweeney and Wells (1990) examined whether students preferred favourable 
or consistent feedback on their exams. On a pre‐exam questionnaire, they asked respondents to state how 
many points they thought they would earn on the upcoming exam and subtracted this value from the 
actual number of points they earned on the exam. Then, this difference score was regressed on feedback 
acceptance and support was found for the self‐verification perspective. However, Edwards (1994, 
2002) noted a number of difficulties with the use of difference scores and developed a regression 
procedure to resolve these problems. One of the main critiques of typical difference measures is that they 
conceal the relative contribution of the component parts of the difference score to the effect on the 
dependent variable. Conceptually, the contributions of the component parts are of particular interest in 
this study because we aim to examine whether (a) people only react to the feedback scores and, thus, only 
one component accounts for the variance in feedback reactions (self‐enhancement perspective) or (b) 
people react to the congruence between the feedback scores and their self‐ratings and, thus, the two 
components account for the variance in feedback reactions (self‐verification perspective). The current 
study is one of the first in the feedback domain to use the regression procedures recommended by 
Edwards and therefore makes it possible to accurately distinguish self‐verifying from self‐enhancing 
feedback reactions. 
Third, various studies (e.g. Jussim et al., 1995) examining self‐verification and self‐enhancement motives 
in the feedback process have used global self‐esteem as a measure of self‐concept. However, recent social 
psychological research has shown that specific self‐views (instead of global self‐esteem) predict people's 
reactions to success and failure (Bernichon, Cook, & Brown, 2003; Dutton & Brown, 1997). For instance, 
individuals with low self‐esteem sometimes choose to self‐verify (accept negative feedback) and 
sometimes choose to self‐enhance (accept positive feedback), depending upon the area of feedback 
(Swann, Pelham, & Krull, 1989). Therefore, Swann et al. (2002) recommended that the self‐enhancement 
and self‐verification motives of individuals should be examined in light of the specific attribute upon 
which feedback is given and specific self‐views should be measured a priori. Therefore, in this study we 
measured self‐ratings for various competencies (instead of global self‐esteem) before feedback was given. 
Note that this approach also parallels common organizational practices where developmental feedback is 
typically provided about various performance elements upon completion of a 360‐degree feedback 
survey, a development centre, or an online assessment instrument and where employees can differently 
respond to feedback about each of these performance elements. 
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Method 
Participants 
A total of 389 individuals (50% male, 50% female) completed a web‐based in‐basket exercise. Their ages 
ranged from 17 to 59 years (M = 31.1 yrs, SD = 10.7). The participants had an average working 
experience of 8.5 years (SD = 10.7) in their company and an average experience of 3.1 years (SD = 4.9) in 
their current position. Eighty‐seven percent of the participants held a bachelors degree and 56% had 
earned an advanced or professional degree. 
Procedure 
A computerized in‐basket exercise was placed on‐line on the website of a governmental service for 
employment and vocational training. This website is frequently visited by applicants and employees 
looking for training and coaching in job application skills and various work‐related competencies. The in‐
basket exercise was advertised as a preparation test for job applicants that provided feedback about 
general managerial competencies. Upon completion of a short questionnaire measuring demographic 
variables, people received a password that gave immediate access to the exercise. 
First, participants rated themselves in a self‐assessment questionnaire on four managerial competencies 
that are included in a recently developed taxonomy of managerial competence (Tett, Guterman, Bleier, & 
Murphy, 2000), namely, Problem Awareness, Coordinating, Information Management, and Decisiveness. 
Next, participants were required to work on a computerized in‐basket exercise that simulated daily work 
activities and measured these four competencies. The computerized in‐basket exercise was adapted 
from Tett, Steele, and Beauregard (2003) and effort was made to ensure the in‐basket exercise was 
realistic (role descriptions, background information, pictures, e‐mail simulation, organizational charts, 
etc.). Responses on the in‐basket exercise were automatically scored according to the scoring rules 
developed by Tett, Menard, Guterman, and Beauregard (2001). People received a feedback report about 
their performance immediately after completing the in‐basket exercise. The feedback report consisted of 
their scores on each of the four competencies and a brief explanatory text. The feedback scores on the 
four competencies ranged from 1 to 10, reflecting a participant's performance relative to other 
participants. A questionnaire measuring feedback satisfaction and perceived utility of feedback per 
competency was attached to the feedback report. 
Measures 
In the self‐assessment questionnaire, participants rated their standing relative to their colleagues on each 
of the four competencies on a 10‐point scale ranging from 1 (bottom five percent) to 10 (top five percent). 
Participants also reported how certain they were of their standing on each of these competencies using 
 8 
 
scales anchored at the end‐points by 1 (not at all certain) to 9 (extremely certain). The mean correlation 
between participants' self‐ratings and their certainty regarding these self‐ratings was moderate (M = 0.48) 
and comparable to previous research (Krosnick, Boninger, Yuang, Berent, & Carnot, 1993; Pelham & 
Swann, 1989). Wording and rating format for the self and certainty ratings were taken from the Self‐
Attribute Questionnaire (SAQ; Pelham & Swann, 1989), which measures similar self‐attributes and has 
shown high test‐retest reliability (.77). 
Feedback satisfaction was measured for each competency with two items adapted from Korsgaard (1996). 
The items used 7‐point Likert‐type response scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree). The scale included items such as, ‘I am satisfied with the score I received on [name competency]’. 
Internal consistencies for this scale varied between .93 and .97 for the different competencies. Feedback 
utility was measured for each competency with two items on a 7‐point scale. These items were ‘The 
feedback I received on [name competency] helped me learn how I can improve my performance’ and ‘I 
intend to use the received feedback on [name competency] in the future’. This measure shows strong 
resemblance to a measure of intended response to feedback that has been shown to predict job 
performance after feedback (Kinicki et al., 2004). Internal consistencies for this scale varied between .82 
and .90 for the different competencies. Correlations between the two scales for each competency ranged 
from −.10 to .18. Exploratory factor analyses indicated that satisfaction and utility items loaded on two 
different factors, demonstrating that these reactions reflect different constructs, as shown in previous 
research (Alliger, Tannenbaum, Bennet, Traver, & Shotland, 1997; Keeping & Levy, 2000). 
Involvement 
We also assessed how important each of these competencies was to the participants on a 9‐point scale, 
with responses ranging from 1 (not at all important) to 9 (extremely important). Participants indicated 
that all the competencies were important to them (M = 7.25, SD = 1.16), illustrating that the participants 
of this study cared about their performance on the in‐basket exercise. A subsample of 100 participants 
also completed an additional questionnaire measuring involvement with six items on a 7‐point scale, with 
responses ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The scale included items such as, ‘The 
background information we received was realistic’, ‘I was motivated to perform well on this exercise’ and 
‘I carefully followed all instructions’. The mean for this scale was 5.80 (SD = 0.76, α = .78), indicating 
that participants were highly involved. 
Analyses 
Given the limitations of traditional congruence measures, we used analytical procedures recommended 
by Edwards (1994, 2002). The following quadratic regression equation was used to determine whether 
predictions of self‐enhancement theory or self‐verification theory were supported. 
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In Equation 1, X and Y represent participants' self‐ratings and feedback scores on the competencies, 
respectively, and FR represents feedback reactions. This equation makes it possible to examine the 
relative contribution of the two components of interest in this study, namely, the feedback scores and the 
self‐ratings. If results are in line with self‐enhancement theory, then higher feedback scores will result in 
more favourable feedback reactions, regardless of their relationship to participants' self‐ratings. In this 
case, only one component (feedback scores) will contribute to feedback reactions. If results are in line 
with self‐verification theory, congruence between the feedback scores and the self‐ratings will lead to 
more favourable feedback reactions, regardless of whether the feedback scores are negative or positive. 
Congruence was examined by testing the algebraic and quadratic difference score models in an 
exploratory manner (Edwards, 2002). Statistically, an algebraic difference model is supported when both 
components (feedback scores and self‐ratings) contribute equally but in opposite directions to feedback 
reactions (b1 = −b2) and the higher‐order terms (X2, XY, Y2) do not explain any variance beyond the linear 
terms. Statistically, a quadratic difference score is supported when both quadratic components contribute 
equally to feedback reactions (b3 = b5) and the following additional constraints are satisfied: (1) b1 = 0, 
(2) b2 = 0, (3) b3 = b5 and (4) b3+b4+b5 = 0. The full constraints and conditions that are statistically tested 
to support each of the models can be found in Edwards (1994, 2002). 
Hierarchical regression analysis was used to test the moderating effects of self‐view certainty. For each 
quadratic equation, the five terms were multiplied by certainty and the increment in R2 yielded by these 
terms was tested, controlling for certainty and the five original quadratic terms (Edwards, 1994; Edwards 
& Rothbard, 1999). If the increment in R2was statistically significant, coefficients from the equation were 
used to determine whether certainty intensified the effects of the congruence between self‐ratings and 
feedback scores on feedback reactions. Prior to quadratic regression analysis, self‐ratings and feedback 
scores were scale centred by subtracting the scale mid‐point to reduce multicollinearity and facilitate 
interpretation (Edwards, 1994). 
The sample size of the present study (N = 389) has the statistical power of .80 (α = .05) to detect a small 
effect size (f2) of .03 (which corresponds approximately to an increase in R2 of about .03) for the quadratic 
difference regression. In addition, using the same alpha, we had a power of .80 to detect an increment 
in R2 of about .03 for the set of terms in the moderated regression equation. 
The relationship between feedback‐self‐rating congruence and feedback reactions and the moderating 
effect of certainty was tested for each of the four competencies and for each dependent variable 
separately, yielding sixteen regression analyses. To control the risk of Type I error associated with these 
analyses, we used the sequential Bonferroni procedure (Seaman, Levin, & Serlin, 1991). This procedure 
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requires the researcher to define the family of tests for which Type I error is controlled. For our purposes, 
a family comprised the tests of the R2 values from the four regression equations for each dependent 
variable. Tests of the four regression equations containing certainty as a moderator were also defined as a 
separate family for each dependent variable (see Edwards & Rothbard, 1999). For each R2value that 
reached significance using this procedure, coefficients from the equation were tested using the nominal 
alpha level (i.e .05). This procedure struck a balance between Type I and Type II errors by only 
considering those equations that reached significance at the required family‐wise alpha while testing 
coefficients from those equations in the usual manner. 
When polynomial regression results are being interpreted, less emphasis is typically placed on the 
significance of specific regression weights than on the surface pattern yielded by the regression equation 
(Edwards, 2001). Therefore, we plotted the response surfaces generated by the regression equations and 
evaluated these in light of the hypothesized response surface in Figure 1 (see also, Edwards & Rothbard, 
1999). 
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for all study variables are presented in Table 1. Results of 
polynomial regression procedures are reported in Tables 2 and 3. As can be seen in the 
columns Fh of Tables 2 and 3, the set of second‐order coefficients did not explain a significant amount of 
variance above the linear terms for any of the four competencies, indicating that a quadratic difference 
score model does not fit the data very well. For feedback satisfaction as a dependent variable (Table 2), 
results for the competency Information Management were in line with self‐enhancement theory. Only the 
coefficient on feedback scores was significant (p <.01). This indicates that people were satisfied with 
positive feedback about Information Management, regardless of self‐ratings. For the other three 
competencies, both coefficients on feedback scores and self‐ratings were significant and in opposite 
directions. The combined effects of feedback scores and self‐ratings on feedback satisfaction for the 
competency Coordinating are depicted in Figure 2. Figure 2shows that feedback scores were more 
dominant in determining feedback satisfaction than self‐ratings. We additionally tested if coefficients 
on X and Y were equal in magnitude but opposite in sign (see Edwards, 1994, 2002). Results showed that 
although coefficients on feedback scores and self‐ratings had an opposite sign, the effects of feedback 
scores were greater in magnitude (p <.01). As can be seen in column Fm in Table 2, self‐view certainty 
did not moderate the relationship between feedback‐self‐rating congruence and feedback satisfaction for 
any of the four competencies. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients
 
 
Table 2. Results of quadratic regressions of feedback satisfaction on self‐ratings and feedback scores
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Table 3. Results of quadratic regressions of feedback utility on self‐ratings and feedback scores
 
 
 
Figure 2. Estimated surface relating congruence between feedback and self‐rating to feedback satisfaction 
for coordinating. 
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Results of the analyses with perceived utility of feedback as a dependent variable show that the equation 
for the competency Decisiveness was in line with predictions of self‐enhancement theory. As can be seen 
in Table 3, there was a significant positive coefficient on feedback scores. However, as hypothesized, the 
quadratic regression was moderated by self‐view certainty. As can be seen in column Fm in Table 3, the 
additional set of moderator terms explained an additional variance of 4% (p <.05) when controlling for 
the quadratic terms and certainty. To interpret the effect of self‐view certainty on the relationship between 
self‐ratings and feedback scores and feedback satisfaction we plotted the response surface for three levels 
of self‐view certainty. If we look along the line of congruence (X = Y) in Figure 3a (low certainty), we see 
a curvilinear relationship, indicating that feedback reactions were most favourable when self‐ratings and 
feedback scores were congruent at their extremes. This is in line with self‐verification theory. However, if 
we look along the X = −Y‐line, we see that feedback satisfaction increased as feedback scores got higher 
and self‐ratings got lower. This is more in line with self‐enhancement theory. If we look at Figure 
3b (moderate certainty), we see a curvilinear relationship between feedback scores and feedback utility 
that is independent of self‐ratings. This indicates that people intended to use feedback 
about Decisiveness in the future when scores were very high or very low, regardless of self‐ratings. This 
effect was even more pronounced when certainty was high (Figure 3c). Thus, although the relationship 
between feedback score‐self‐rating congruence and feedback utility was moderated by self‐view certainty, 
the observed effect was not in the hypothesized direction that was presented in Figure 1. 
For the three other competencies, none of the theoretical perspectives were supported with feedback 
utility as a dependent variable. Although a significant amount of variance was explained (p <.05), none of 
the coefficients reached significance. 
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Figure 3. Estimated surfaces relating congruence between feedback and self‐rating to feedback utility at 
three levels of certainty for decisiveness. (a) Certainty low. (b) Certainty moderate. (c) Certainty high. 
 
Discussion 
The aim of this study was to clarify mixed results from previous research concerning feedback reactions. 
Two competing perspectives in social psychology, self‐enhancement and self‐verification theory, served 
as conceptual underpinnings of this study. Our basic premise was that none of them was dominant in 
guiding feedback reactions. Instead, we hypothesized that self‐view certainty would serve as a moderator 
and would strengthen the effect of congruence between individuals self‐views and the performance 
feedback they receive about these self‐views on feedback reactions. 
The stringent analytical procedure recommended by Edwards (1994) was especially suited to examine our 
hypothesis because it enabled us to test if feedback reactions were based on a two‐step appraisal versus a 
one‐step appraisal of the feedback. If both components (i.e. feedback scores and self‐ratings) accounted 
for an equal amount of variance, feedback reactions were characterized by a two step‐appraisal and self‐
verification theory was supported. When only one component (feedback scores) was significant or more 
dominant than the other, feedback reactions were characterized by a one‐step appraisal and self‐
enhancement theory was supported. 
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Results showed that satisfaction with feedback was generally determined by a two‐step appraisal of the 
feedback. Both feedback scores and self‐ratings predicted feedback satisfaction in opposite directions. 
This seems to be in line with predictions of self‐verification theory. However, self‐verification theory also 
predicts that both effects will be equally strong. This was not the case. Feedback scores were stronger in 
predicting feedback satisfaction, indicating that self‐enhancement strivings are more dominant than self‐
verification strivings in guiding feedback satisfaction. This finding is consistent with recent research on 
self‐evaluation in social psychology which has demonstrated that people often try to simultaneously 
satisfy self‐enhancement and self‐verification motives when processing feedback. These studies indicated 
that, while both motives are activated, the self‐enhancement motive is typically stronger than the self‐
verification motive (Bernichon et al., 2003; Sedikides, 1993; Sedikides & Green, 2004; Sedikides & 
Gregg, 2003; Swann et al., 1989). We also found that people perceived greater utility of feedback when 
feedback scores were high, regardless of self‐ratings, for the competency Decisiveness, which is in line 
with self‐enhancement theory. This effect was moderated by self‐view certainty, although the effect was 
not in the predicted direction. We found no other moderating effects of self‐view certainty. 
In general, little evidence was found for self‐verification as the dominant motive underlying feedback 
reactions. Instead, the results seem to corroborate self‐enhancement theory, which predicts that people are 
motivated to view themselves as favourably as possible. Furthermore, it seems that certainty does not play 
a key role as a moderator of feedback reactions and, thus, does not strengthen the self‐verification motive. 
This is rather surprising given previous findings in social psychological research that people tend to seek 
and accept information that is consistent with central self‐views (Dauenheimer et al., 1999; Dutton & 
Brown, 2003; Markus, 1977) and that certainty serves as a moderator of the self‐verification motive (Bui 
& Pelham, 2000; Chen et al., 2004; Pelham & Swann, 1994; Seta, Donaldson, & Seta, 1999; Swann & 
Pelham, 2002). 
Why is there only evidence for self‐enhancement in organizational psychology? Or to put it differently, 
why is no support found for self‐verification in organizational psychology? Several explanations seem 
plausible. First, careful inspection of the literature shows that no research using congruence analyses 
(Edwards, 1994) has examined self‐verification theory. The results of the present study illustrate the 
importance of using this stringent regression procedure. We also conducted the analyses using an 
algebraic difference score as an independent variable, as did previous research (e.g. Sweeney & Wells, 
1990). Results showed that the algebraic difference was a significant predictor (p <.01) of feedback 
reactions for each competency. Self‐view certainty did not moderate the effect of the difference scores on 
feedback reactions.1 The results of these analyses would have led us to wrongfully conclude that self‐
verification theory was supported in all analyses. Also, more recent research supporting self‐verification 
theory continues to use difference scores (e.g. Polzer, Milton, & Swann, 2002). It is possible that many 
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alleged self‐verification effects in the literature conceal unequal effects in the magnitude of different 
components. Future research examining self‐verification processes would definitely benefit from using 
congruence analyses (Edwards, 2001). 
Second, consistency effects are not easily obtained or replicated (Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995). 
Therefore, researchers have often used specific strategies to make self‐verification strivings more 
pronounced. For instance, self‐verification effects have been observed when an over‐sampling strategy 
was used by only selecting subjects that scored in the top and bottom quartiles of an independent variable 
(e.g. Bosson & Swann, 1999) or when dependent variables were made more extreme by multiplying self‐
ratings with certainty and importance ratings (e.g. Korsgaard, 1996; Stahlberg, Petersen, & Dauenheimer, 
1999).2Although these studies provide important insights into the underlying mechanisms and 
consequences of the self‐verification motive, the present study suggests that self‐verification strivings are 
maybe not that dominant in a natural context. 
A third possible explanation is the task that is used to provide feedback to participants. Studies in social 
psychology that support the self‐verification perspective on feedback reactions typically use laboratory 
tasks such as anagrams, block designs and concept formation (e.g. Jussim et al., 1995; Stahlberg et al., 
1999). In organizational research which generally supports the self‐enhancement motive, employees 
received feedback about job performance (e.g. Brett & Atwater, 2001; Illies et al., 2006). As shown 
by Jones (1973), self‐verification effects are less likely (compared to self‐enhancement effects) to occur 
when people are highly involved and care about their task performance. Thus, it is possible that self‐
enhancement is more dominant in guiding feedback reactions in a natural work context. 
This study is not without its limitations. First, both self‐ratings and certainty ratings were self‐report 1‐
item measures, possibly threatening the reliability of these self‐ratings. However, in this on‐line setting it 
was not practically feasible to use extensive questionnaires to measure self‐views because participants 
would not proceed with the in‐basket exercise if the preceding questionnaire was too long. However, 
future research could use other measures of self‐view certainty, for instance, by graphically marking 
uncertainty intervals (Baumgardner, 1993) or by measuring reaction times (Molden & Higgins, 2004). 
Second, power analysis revealed that power in this study was sufficient to detect small effect sizes. 
However, moderator effects are often very small and difficult to detect due to statistical power problems 
in moderated multiple regressions (Aguinis, Beaty, Boik, & Pierce, 2005; McClelland & Judd, 
1993; Zedeck, 1971). This could explain why only one moderator effect was found. Third, due to the on‐
line research setting, we had no control over self‐selection and participant drop‐out. Therefore, future 
research should examine whether these findings generalize to specific populations. 
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This study has important implications for organizations. The procedure of this study corresponds closely 
to the use of self‐assessment instruments that often precede the actual development process. For instance, 
as part of a development programme, employees are often asked to complete self‐assessment 
questionnaires or participate in a development centre or 360‐degree feedback process. After going 
through the assessment process, people receive a feedback report with narrative and quantitative feedback 
on several managerial competencies, as did the participants in this study. Our results suggest that people 
who receive negative feedback and, thus, are most in need of improvement and development tend to be 
dissatisfied and reject feedback because it appears inaccurate. Thus, after receiving negative feedback, the 
chances are high that dissatisfied employees will no longer be motivated to develop their competencies, 
which is detrimental to their future performance. Therefore, practitioners should seek strategies to 
increase acceptance of negative feedback. An example of such a strategy is the use of feedback coaches 
and feedback workshops that assist people in analysing feedback reports and formulating development 
plans. Recent research shows that managers who participated in a feedback workshop after multi‐source 
feedback changed their behaviour accordingly, whereas managers who only received a feedback report 
did not (Seifert, Yukl, & McDonald, 2003). 
In terms of future research, the problem of negative feedback acceptance is an important and potentially 
fruitful area of research. Future research should examine specific strategies that organizations might adopt 
to increase acceptance of negative feedback. Elaboration on feedback seems to be an especially promising 
variable for designing specific acceptance strategies. Social psychological research shows that self‐
enhancement prevails when people lack the time and cognitive resources to analyse the obtained 
feedback. However, when people are motivated or requested to actively process and elaborate feedback, 
self‐enhancement strivings go down, possibly leading to higher levels of feedback acceptance (Hixon & 
Swann, 1993; Paulhus, Graf, & Van Selst, 1989; Swann, Hixton, Stein‐Seroussi, & Gilbert, 1990). Future 
research should also investigate if an emphasis on the developmental nature of feedback leads to higher 
feedback acceptance. For instance, it is possible that acceptance of negative feedback in developmental 
assessment centres is higher because of the developmental nature of the feedback process. Finally, future 
studies should also pay attention to possible determinants of the perceived utility of feedback. The results 
of this study indicate that very little variance (about 4%) in feedback utility is explained by feedback 
scores and self‐ratings. Furthermore, the moderating effect of certainty on feedback utility for the 
competency Decisiveness was not as hypothesized. Given the low explained variance and the unexpected 
pattern of results, caution is needed in interpreting these findings and more research on predictors of 
feedback utility is needed (for a recent study, see Kinicki et al., 2004). As feedback utility perceptions 
about the different competencies were highly correlated in this study, it is possible that individual 
difference variables (e.g. learning goal orientation or openness to experience) underlie these utility 
perceptions. 
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In sum, our findings suggest that feedback reactions are dominated by self‐enhancement strivings and that 
self‐verification strivings are less prominent. Support for the moderating role of self‐view certainty in the 
feedback process was limited. The general finding that people seem to be dissatisfied after receiving 
negative feedback and tend to reject unfavourable feedback shows that the study of feedback reactions 
continues to be an important and fruitful avenue for future research. 
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